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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

DAILY DIGEST

Date: MAY 22 1951

- NOTE: 1. This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence.
2. Comments represent the preliminary views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
3. Marginal letter indications are defined as follows:
- "A" - items indicating Soviet-Communist intentions or capabilities
  - "B" - important regional developments not necessarily related to Soviet/Communist intentions or capabilities
  - "C" - other information indicating trends and potential developments

NAVY AND DOS review(s) completed.

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

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"A" CZECHOSLOVAKIA. State Department Agrees Blackmail May Be Issue in Oatis Case. In answer to US Ambassador Brigg's report on his conversation with Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Siroky regarding the arrest of US newsman Oatis, the State Department cabled Praha that Siroky's references to "US-sponsored" Radio Free Europe broadcasts clearly suggest that the Czechoslovak Government may be attempting blackmail in the case. If this assumption proves correct, the State Department doubts whether Oatis would be released before the US exerts pressure on his behalf. While the Department agrees, in deference to Ambassador Brigg's on-the-spot opinion, to temporarily await further developments, it considers that the time for vigorous counteraction must come soon. In addition, the Associated Press is exerting strong pressure on the State Department to take action immediately.

"B" HUNGARY. Basic Industry Receives Emphasis Under Revised Five Year Plan. Legislation enacted by the Hungarian Parliament on 17 May legalizes changes in the Five Year Plan originally outlined at the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party Congress in February. Although the full text of the measure is not available, press reports indicate that emphasis will be placed on expanding basic industries including iron, steel and coal. The US Legation in Budapest comments that publicity accompanying the bill reveals that the revised plan reflects (1) current war tension, and (2) faulty party planning. These factors, however, have been aggravated by others which could not be fully anticipated such as agricultural shortages resulting from the drought in 1950 and the tightening of Western controls on exports to the Soviet orbit.

COMMENT: The general trend throughout the East European area is one of marked emphasis on the expansion of basic industry, which will contribute to the long-term military capability of the Soviet orbit. This stress on expansion is confirmed by a recent UN survey which indicates that

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industrial production in the European satellite area has grown at a faster rate during 1950 than in Western Europe. The survey also reveals that Eastern Europe is currently less affected by industrial raw material scarcities than are West European industries.

25X1 "C" RUMANIA. Food Shortages Admitted by Communists. A growing shortage of food in Rumania has forced the Rumanian Communist Government to take public note of the situation. Concurrently with the press announcement on 15 April of the formation of a State Supply Committee in the cabinet, a leading Bucharest newspaper published a front-page editorial admitting deficiencies in the food supply situation. A national conference of the General Confederation of Labor made similar admissions. The US Legation in Bucharest points out that while the Communists publicly charge such deficiencies to the backwardness of agriculture in clinging to small-plot farming, sabotage by profiteers, and to poor management by State agencies, the real reason for such shortages lies in the tremendous shipments of Rumanian foodstuffs to the USSR, other satellites, and even to Western Europe. The Legation further comments that, despite the extent of speculation and governmental mismanagement in pre-Communist times, food shortages were relatively unheard of in Rumania. [REDACTED]

25X1 "B" YUGOSLAVIA. Cominform Spy Net Uncovered in Belgrade. The former president of the Yugoslav metallurgical workers' syndicates, Lazar Plavsic, has been arrested in Belgrade and charged with maintaining contact with the Cominform underground. As president of the metallurgical workers' syndicate, Plavsic was in a position to sabotage some of the government's most important industrial projects, including the Zenica steel mills, the Bor copper mines, and the Trepca lead mines. A press office official has stated, however, that sabotage of Yugoslav industrial plants was not involved. [REDACTED] COMMENT: Yugoslav authorities recently arrested an employee of the Czechoslovak Embassy in Belgrade and a Yugoslav army captain on charges of espionage. It is possible that Yugoslav security forces, as a result of these arrests, have uncovered a Cominform underground in Belgrade involving Plavsic. The fact that Yugoslav authorities apparently do not intend to use Plavsic as a scapegoat for admitted deficiencies in important industrial projects supports the belief that a bona-fide Cominform underground has been discovered.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

25X1 "B" GENERAL. Shah States That Admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO Would Have Bad Effect In Iran. The Shah, in conversation with the US Ambassador in Tehran, in commenting on US sponsorship of Turkey and Greece for membership in NATO, stated that their admittance to NATO would have a bad effect in Iran if nothing were done about Iran. The Ambassador feels that a statement by the US Government regarding Iran at the time Turkey and Greece enter NATO would be in order and helpful. [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED] COMMENT: The Shah as well as other Iranian leaders have let it be known during the past two years that they were disappointed and dissatisfied with the amount of aid given Iran in comparison with Turkey and Greece. In presenting their case, they have pointed out that Iran was most vulnerable to Soviet aggression. While the present government will hardly press its inclusion in Western defense arrangements, NATO's acceptance of Turkey and Greece will only add a bit to general Iranian bitterness and irritation.

"B" IRAN. Shah Continues to Fear Actions of Iranian Prime Minister. In conversations with the US Ambassador in Tehran, the Shah expressed the fear that Prime Minister Mossadeq might "do harm" before his government falls. The Shah deplored his own position as a "looker-on" and stated that he was afraid that the new oil commission would be terrorized into action dictated by the extremists and spearheaded by Mossadeq. In conclusion, the Shah expressed himself very strongly on the futility of the Prime Minister's apparent program of neutrality. [REDACTED] 25X1

25X1 "B" EGYPT. Egyptians Charge UK Support Behind Iraq's Air Assistance to Syria. US Ambassador Caffery in Cairo has been informed by several "top-drawer" Egyptians that they believe the UK was behind Iraq's recent dispatch of planes and other military assistance to Syria. [REDACTED] 25X

25X1 [REDACTED] The Egyptians also charged that this Iraqi action was a step in the direction of a British-sponsored Iraq-Syria union. Caffery reports that he told the Egyptian officials he believed both accusations to be false. [REDACTED] COMMENT: The fact that the UK urged Syria to get rid of the Iraqi military aid would indicate that the Egyptian allegations are not true. The Egyptian charges have probably resulted (a) from their increasing concern that Iraq might use its dispatch

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of air assistance to Damascus as a means to promote an Iraq-Syria union—a perennial Egyptian fear—and (b) from the Egyptian belief that Iraq could not succeed in attaining such an objective without British support.

"B" JORDAN. Prime Minister Disapproves of Iraqi Military Aid to Syria. Jordanian Prime Minister Samir Rifai told US Charge Fritzlan on 19 May that the Iraqi dispatch of military aid to Syria came as a surprise to him. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The Prime Minister agreed that such action was unwise while the Israeli-Syrian dispute remained undecided.

[REDACTED] COMMENT: Iraq's hasty action in sending air units to Syria has resulted in the other Arab states reviewing their position on the question of aid to Syria. A desire to prevent Iraq from achieving a special position in Syria will certainly enter into their ultimate decisions. While King Abdullah and his Prime Minister have often disagreed in the past, Abdullah, who is currently visiting Turkey, probably is as concerned as Samir Rifai over Iraq's military assistance to Syria.

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"A" PAKISTAN. Ambassador from Communist China Approved. According to a press despatch from Karachi, the Government of Pakistan announced on 21 May that it had accepted Han Nien-Lung as Communist Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan. [REDACTED]

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"B" THAILAND. Kach Granted Bail. According to the Bangkok press, Lt. Gen. Luang Kach was released on bail by the criminal court on 15 May. By this action the court denied a police request for a 12-day extension of Kach's detention. US Embassy Bangkok comments that the request for extended detention reflects police General Phao's apprehension concerning Kach's future political activities which will doubtless include an attempt to regain influence lost during 17 months of exile. [REDACTED]

25X1

"B" Thais Considering New Restrictions on Relations with Communist China. According to an authoritative local press report, the Thai Government is considering the suspension of all communications with Communist China and a prohibition of resident Chinese remittances to China. It is also reported that Thailand has instructed its delegate to the UN to propose a worldwide ban on communications with China. The US Embassy in Bangkok comments that these actions would stimulate unnecessary criticism of the Thai Government and possibly increase Communist activity which the Thais are unprepared to combat. [REDACTED]

COMMENT: The tempo of Communist activities in Thailand will be determined more by overall Communist planning than by any action by the Thai Government.

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"B" INDOCHINA. Vietnamese Catholics Rebel Against Higher Clergy.

[REDACTED] the predominantly Catholic population and most of the lower clergy of Vietnamese nationality are hostile to the "autonomy" policy of the two Vietnamese Catholic bishops of this area. The population as a whole favors a status of full unity with Vietnam as opposed to the bishops' policy - supported by Premier Tran Van Huu - of creating a virtually autonomous theocracy in the southern provinces. A Vietnamese priest who is leading opposition to the bishops' policy spoke of armed insurrection if the movement toward autonomy is permitted to continue. [REDACTED]

COMMENT: Friction between the Catholic minority of Tonkin and the regional government of North Vietnam was used as a weapon by Premier Tran Van Huu in his successful campaign to break the power of Governor Nguyen Huu Tri and his Dai Viet Party. Huu apparently overextended himself, however, in backing the ambitions of the Vietnamese prelates. This episode constitutes further evidence of Huu's willingness to encourage regional particularism at the expense of Vietnamese national unity where such a tactic serves his own political ends.

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"A" CHINA. Alleged Chinese Communist Worries over Korea. The French Consul-General at Shanghai reports that Chinese Communist leaders are "disturbed" by the human and material costs of their Korean

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venture but are unable to seek a "pacific settlement," due to considerations of prestige and Moscow's opposition to such a course.

[redacted] the Chinese leaders fear UN bombardment of vital centers in Manchuria and do not count upon Soviet intervention in such an event. [redacted]

[redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] the statement of a Chinese Communist leader that Peiping is "not interested" in a Korean settlement at this time and has "no fear" of an extension of hostilities to China during 1951. [redacted]

[redacted] There is no evidence of a Sino-Soviet difference of opinion in regard to Korean policy. Although there is no reliable confirmation of a frequently reported Soviet agreement to intervene directly in the event of UN air operations against China, such Soviet action is generally regarded as a strong possibility.

"B"

French Ford Trucks Arriving in Hong Kong for Chinese Communists. The US Consul General in Hong Kong reports that French Ford three-ton trucks are now arriving there in large numbers and that he is urging the Colonial Government to stop the re-export of these trucks to the Communist mainland. The Colony earlier this month stopped the shipment of 51 Dodge trucks, and according to evidence obtained by the Consul General, the Communists intend to abandon Hong Kong as a source for trucks, if the Government bans export of the French Fords as well. The Consul General believes the Communists may endeavor to effect future deliveries via the Burma Road. [redacted]

COMMENT: With the progressive broadening of Hong Kong's export controls, the Communists are said to be transferring their purchasing activities to other areas, particularly India, where they reportedly negotiated a contract for several hundred five-ton trucks earlier this month. Hong Kong's seizure of the French Fords, following close on its seizure of the 51 Dodge trucks, would give further impetus to Communist efforts to by-pass the Colony and develop alternate supply channels.

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"C" ROK Assembly Seeks to Restrict Rhee's Authority. According to a 21 May press account from Korea, leaders of four opposition groups within the ROK have revived an attempt to enact the Governmental Reorganization Amendment to the Constitution. The amendment, designed to make the Prime Minister responsible to the Legislature rather than to the Executive, has been a great point of dissension in the ROK and has already suffered one defeat prior to the beginning of the Korean war. [REDACTED] 25X1

COMMENT: Although President Rhee has a working plurality in the ROK Assembly, an opposition coalition, such as elected Vice President Kim Sung-su, would have a greatly improved chance of getting this constitutional amendment enacted.

"C" JAPAN. Sterling Area Trade Talks to be Held. SCAP has announced that a conference to renegotiate the Japan-Sterling Area payments arrangements will be held in Tokyo starting next Thursday. Negotiations at the conference are expected to center around the controversial issue of the "dollar clause" in the present arrangement, which requires settlement in dollars for balances in excess of agreed-upon working capital. [REDACTED] 25X1

25X1 [REDACTED] COMMENT: Removal of the threat of a dollar drain on the Sterling Bloc unquestionably would serve to stimulate Japan's trade with that area. The Japanese, however, fear that they would accumulate large balances of sterling which could not be used to settle adverse balances with the dollar area. The approaching conference has stimulated a controversy among economic circles as to whether Japan in the future should join the dollar or the sterling area.

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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)

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"C" GERMANY. McCloy Asks Germans to Cut Off ECA Aid to Illegal Traders.  
US High Commissioner McCloy today asked Chancellor Adenauer to institute all measures necessary to prevent any allocation of ECA funds, or commodity imports for ECA dollars, to any company or person engaging in illegal trade with the Soviet orbit. McCloy informed Adenauer that he is recommending that the US prohibit the export of critical goods to west Germans doing illegal Eastern trade.  
[REDACTED] COMMENT: Adenauer recently announced that his Government would take legal action against illegal traders, as well as deny them scarce raw materials.

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"B" FRANCE-TUNISIA. French Exert Pressure on Bey to Dismiss His Cabinet.  
The French Resident General has informed the reigning monarch, Lamine Pasha Bey, that if the present Tunisian Cabinet is retained the French will conduct no further negotiations with it. The Bey, in turn, has sent a telegram of protest to the President of the French Republic charging the Resident General with an unfriendly attitude. Because the dismissal of his ministers would be a difficult decision for the Bey, who has just proclaimed his complete confidence in them, he probably will take no action for the present. The Residency anticipates that the nationalists will use the incident to incite disorders, but does not expect "serious developments".  
[REDACTED] COMMENT: The Resident's ultimatum is another indication that the French intend to maintain the whiphand in Tunisia, similar to General Juin's demarche to the Sultan of Morocco last January. Native demonstrations and disorders probably will occur, but French troops and police in the area are capable of keeping incidents at a minimum. Of more far-reaching consequence is the fanning of anti-French sentiment in the Middle East, already aroused by the Moroccan crisis.

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"C" ITALY. Communists Appear Headed for Defeat at the Polls. Italians appear agreed that the Communists will lose control of many important cities in the forthcoming local elections. The only question seems to be how many. The general feeling is that the Christian Democrats will take some loss in the percentage of the total vote compared with the 1948 national elections and that the smaller parties will make moderate gains. In any event the elections will give the first opportunity since 1948 for judging the trend of popular opinion. The Christian Democrats appear to have the edge over their Communist opponents in vigor and combativeness. The former, aided by the Church, are fighting absenteeism, which they fear would benefit the Communists, who are urging those dissatisfied with the Government

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but unwilling to vote for the Communists, to abstain. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COMMENT: The above consensus generally conforms with previous OCI estimates. Results of the Doxa poll on issues similar to those of the forthcoming elections indicate a 21% vote for the Communists and a 39% for the Christian Democrats—a loss of about 10% for both parties compared to the 1948 elections and a corresponding gain for the extreme right. Although it has recently been reported that the population as a whole appears unexcited over the elections, the concerted last-minute campaign by the Christian Democrats and the Church will probably succeed in reducing absenteeism.



"C" SWITZERLAND. Unprecedented Boom in Swiss Imports. April imports in Switzerland have set an all-time monthly record at one million francs while the raw material price index has increased sixteen points, the sharpest jump yet recorded. The trade deficit for the first four months of the year is running at an unprecedented annual rate of two billion francs as a result of stockpiling. Swiss economists estimate that the Swiss can only cover a 1.3 billion Swiss francs' merchandise trade deficit through invisible exports. [REDACTED] 25X1

25X1 [REDACTED] COMMENT: The stockpiling program in Switzerland has been going on for the past two years. However, the sharp rise in imports during 1951 is probably due not only to the Swiss rearmament program, but possibly to a new sense of urgency in the international situation. Despite the apparent excessively unfavorable balance of trade for 1951, the accumulation of unused capital is sufficient to cope easily with this situation. The sharply rising cost of imports has not as yet made its full impact on the Swiss market; therefore, sharply rising costs of living may be expected shortly.

"C" US Mission to Berne to Negotiate on Trade Controls. US Minister Vincent suggests that there be clear understanding by both sides on the scope and purposes of the US mission to be sent to Switzerland to negotiate on trade controls. He believes the Swiss will attempt to stand by their "normal trade" concept. The Swiss consider that the problem of trade control with the Soviet

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bloc has very important political implications for Switzerland and that therefore there should be no publicity and that the US delegation should not be composed primarily of technical personnel.

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[REDACTED] COMMENT: Previous Swiss conduct on this problem suggests that lengthy negotiations may be necessary before any definite progress is made. Over the past two years, the Swiss have been able to avoid any definite commitment over export controls, and further procrastination can be expected.

"B" SPAIN. Madrid Workers Boycott Public Transportation. The people of Madrid today expressed their discontent with the high cost of living by boycotting the public transportation system, despite an overwhelming display of government force and official threats of severe reprisals against workers who reported late or were absent from work. As far as could be ascertained this morning, the call for a general work stoppage has not been heeded, but the workers obeyed appeals in anonymous pamphlets issued here for the past two weeks and walked to their jobs. [REDACTED] COMMENT: The long-awaited Madrid popular protest against the high cost of living is a deliberate attempt by the Monarchist-led opposition groups within the CIC (Comite Interior de Coordinacion) to embarrass Franco and speed his downfall. Although one phase of the strike, the boycott against public transportation, appears to have met with some degree of success, it is still too early to gauge the effectiveness of the CIC's efforts to spread the strikes beyond the separatist regions of Catalonia and the Basque Provinces. A fully successful Madrid general strike could well be the catalytic agent for the rapid extension of the strikes to other sections of Spain.

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"C" UNITED KINGDOM. Public Opinion Poll Shows Slight Increase in Labor Party Support. According to an announcement by the Gallup Poll of public opinion, the Labor Party's popularity rose from 38.5% in late April (the poll was taken immediately following the Cabinet resignations) to 40% in mid-May while support for the Conservative Party correspondingly dropped from 51.5% to 49%. Personal approval of Prime Minister Attlee rose during the same period by 8 points from 49 to 57%. The May poll revealed also that the issues then "foremost in the public mind" were the Budget, the Bevan-Wilson resignations, and the Anglo-Argentine meat agreement which will result in an increase in the British ration. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] COMMENT: Despite the rise thus suggested in public support for the Labor Party, there does not yet appear to be a definite reversal of the anti-Labor trend of the past few months. In the municipal elections of 7-11 May the Labor Party approximately held its own and the Conservatives retained the advantageous positions gained in the 1949 elections.

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22 May 1951

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)

"B" IRAN. Iranian Statement Accuses US of Interference in Iranian Affairs.

On 21 May, Foreign Minister Kazemi handed US Ambassador Grady a statement asserting that the US declaration on the oil question has created a very undesirable impression in Iran. According to the Iranian aide memoire, the US recommendation can only be regretted as an interference in the internal affairs of Iran. US Ambassador Grady reported on the same day that protests over the statement continues and that demonstrations against the US were called for 22 May. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] COMMENT: The Iranians, who are traditionally sensitive to foreign criticism, are apparently doubly critical of the US for urging that the oil problem be settled by arbitration and for declaring that US oil companies would not attempt to take advantage of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's misfortunes. Apparently Prime Minister Mossadeq has interpreted the statement as US support of the Oil Company's position. [REDACTED] the Tudeh has alerted its members to be "on call" for the demonstrations reportedly organized by Mullah Kashani and other National Frontists for 22 May, the birthday of the twelfth Imam.

"B" Iranian Senator Assures US Ambassador no Forceful Seizure of UK Oil Properties Planned. Shafaq, a Senate member of the Parliamentary Oil Committee charged with studying implementation of the oil nationalization law, has assured US Ambassador Grady that he is convinced Iran would not take military measures to gain possession of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's (AIOC) properties. Shafaq and other members of the group with whom Grady discussed the matter were emphatic that Prime Minister Mossadeq did not intend to confiscate or "semi-confiscate" the properties of AIOC. Shafaq added that any discussion by Oil Company representatives with the Parliamentary Committee should be informal since he felt that the Committee would not function through hearings but would work out a program and then take measures to implement it. [REDACTED] COMMENT: On 20 May Iran rejected AIOC's request for arbitration of the oil dispute. The Iranians undoubtedly wish to implement nationalization of the oil industry peacefully, and Prime Minister Mossadeq, in rejecting the request, invited the Oil Company to designate representatives qualified to join with the Oil Committee for the prompt execution of the oil nationalization law.

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However, continued difficulties in working out the problem, AIOC determination to retain control of its oil interests in Iran, and popular pressure may combine to force Mossadeq to take more drastic steps than he now contemplates. While Shafaq's statements are reassuring since they indicate that Iran does not intend to take over forcefully the properties of AIOC, he and the remainder of the group with whom Ambassador Grady discussed the matter are conservatives who might be expected to hold such a view.

"C" JAPAN. Prime Minister Yoshida Will Not Disclose Treaty Draft to Opposition. In a conversation with the US Political Advisor in Tokyo, Prime Minister Yoshida stated that he is under great pressure from his own and opposition parties to make public the suggested peace treaty draft. When advised that the treaty had not yet been made public in the US or any other Allied country, but that there presumably would be no objection to letting opposition party leaders read the draft, Yoshida replied that he does not trust them and will keep the matters as they are. 25X1

25X1 COMMENT: Yoshida has been under considerable fire from the opposition parties and part of the press for his "secret diplomacy". He apparently is becoming sensitive over this criticism, which stems from the fear that Yoshida may have over-committed Japan, especially in respect to the post-treaty defense arrangements.

## SECTION 3 (WESTERN)

"B" FRANCE. French Want to Delay German Defense Agreements. The Foreign Office German Affairs Director Sauvagnargues has indicated that objections and misgivings of a policy nature may delay a decision on the contractual relations now under discussion between the Germans and the Western allies. Sauvagnargues believes that formulation of Western intentions should not be discussed with the Germans. The question of the principle of sovereignty is still the major French preoccupation in connection with the contractual arrangements, and the French are concerned lest the presence of Western forces in Germany be dependent on German consent, whether implied or explicit. Sauvagnargues prefers not go beyond a general statement of intention now in order to avoid a detailed declaration which would "discount" the effect of the contemplated arrangements. 25X1 COMMENT: The French have been anxious to obtain a German proposal on contractual arrangements to serve as a basis for a tripartite statement on the question of sovereignty. The French believe that the Germans will make their military contribution depend less on Allied political concessions than on a build-up of Allied strength in Germany, and for that reason the French Foreign Office wants to avoid disclosing the Allied position too soon.

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"B" NORWAY. Parliamentary Opposition to Greece-Turkey NATO Membership Expected. Reporting at some length on Foreign Minister Lange's attitude toward the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO, US Ambassador Bay estimates that Norway will find it difficult to accept these two countries ideologically but will agree if the proposal is presented on strategic grounds with the full support of NATO. Foreign Minister Lange himself, although partially persuaded of the military advisability of admitting Greece and Turkey, does not feel that they meet the democratic qualifications originally envisioned for NATO, and contemplates considerable difficulty in persuading Parliament to approve their admission. However, he believes that if the NATO Council of Foreign Ministers (meeting in August) calls for admission on military grounds, the Parliament would agree that, just as Norway is essential to defense of the northern flank, Greece and Turkey are essential to the southern flank. [REDACTED] 25X1

COMMENT: The Norwegian Foreign Office has already indicated that it will recommend approval of Greek and Turkish admission. [REDACTED] 25X1

"B" Parliament Strictly Interprets Foreign Base Restriction. Foreign Minister Lange has indicated to the British Ambassador that Parliament will be extremely reluctant to relax the Government policy against peacetime foreign bases on Norwegian soil, even to the extent of permitting foreign technicians to aid in maintenance and technical work at Norwegian bases. Although the Foreign Minister himself favors accepting such foreign assistance, he maintains that the plan is most delicate politically and must be approached cautiously. Lange believes that if the NATO Council (rather than SHAPE) requests Norwegian cooperation on this program, it will be more favorably received by Parliament. [REDACTED] 25X1

COMMENT: On most recent issues involving Norway's role in the East-West conflict (e.g. restrictions on East-West trade, and Greek-Turkish NATO membership, as well as on this issue), Norway will ultimately endorse the US suggestion despite the initial reluctance [REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] which is partly a reflection of tactical parliamentary considerations, but mainly an insistence that Norwegian independence cannot be taken for granted by the US. In addition, Norway doubtless hopes to remind the Great Powers that the smaller countries are fearful of acting precipitately on courses which may sharpen the East-West conflict. 25X

"B" BRAZIL. Prospects for Brazilian Military Aid to Korea. General Goes Monteiro, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, has advised US Ambassador Johnson that he is certain that the Brazilian Foreign Office proposal to send a mission to Korea would be "useful". Ambassador Johnson feels as a result of the conversation that, in the General's mind, the sending of the mission has been decided, and that the General agrees that the mission must be followed by "concrete action". [REDACTED] 25X1

COMMENT: The mission was originally proposed by Brazilian officials as a means of preparing Brazilian public sentiment for sending a military contingent to Korea. The mission would be composed of important Brazilian military and diplomatic persons who would visit the UN, Tokyo, and Korea and then make a report on their trip. At the present time, considerable segments of Brazil's

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population are either opposed to sending troops to Korea or are unenthusiastic about such a move. Many Government officials, however, support it. Meanwhile, the increased Communist propaganda against Brazil's entrance into the UN action in Korea has taken the line that "the formation of a Latin American army would be contrary to the constitutional provision about our armed forces, which are destined for the defense of our country, and not to act as mercenary troops of a foreign government".

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